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Legalized Kidnapping of Children
by Their Parents
I. Introduction
The authority of parents over their children is fundamental to
our society.1 The bounds of parental authority are exceeded, how-
ever, when a parent abducts his child against the will of the child or
of the other parent or guardian. This act interferes with the personal
liberty of the child and the custody rights of the other parent. It thus
qualifies as kidnapping.2
No effective sanction exists against parental kidnapping. Crimi-
nal statutes exempt parents explicitly or by judicial interpretation.
Civil remedies are ineffective. Theories of tort recovery are weak
and often barred by the doctrine of parental immunity. The civil
contempt process is of limited applicability and may be circumvented
by a contrary custody decree in another state.
Moreover, parental kidnapping is not only permitted by the
courts; it is encouraged. A parent who removes his child from a state
1. Child custody eludes consistent definition. At common law it was the right
of the parent incident to his duty to care for his child. The father was entitled to
the custody, earnings, and services of his children as a result of his obligation to
maintain and educate them. A more modem definition is the relationship existing
between parents and children in an ongoing family. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMES-
Tic RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 17.2, at 573 (1968).
Family life has been held by the United States Supreme Court to be constitu-
tionally protected. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1961); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Court also has held parental custody
rights to be "far more precious . . . than property rights." May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528, 533 (1953). Custody rights are protected by the due process safeguards
of the fourteenth amendment. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Newton v.
Burgen, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C.), affd, 414 U.S. 1139 (1973). In Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), the Court held, "It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder."
2. At common law kidnapping was defined as the forcible abduction or steal-
ing away of a man, woman, or child from his own country and sending him to an-
other. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219. The fundamental elements of most
modern kidnapping statutes are an unlawful detention and an unlawful asportation.
R. PERKINs, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw 177 (2d ed. 1969); see, e.g., 18 PA. C.S.
§ 2901; MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (Prop. Off. Draft 1962). The family unit re-
ceives special protection in some states through statutes prohibiting interference with
custody. E.g., 18 PA. C.S. § 2904; MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4 (Prop. Off. Draft
1962).
customarily is granted a custody hearing in the destination state even
though that parent has defied a custody decree of the origin state.
Ironically the justification for granting a second custody hearing is
said to be the state's concern for child welfare.3 In cases of parental
kidnapping, however, that concern is misplaced. States can promote
child welfare most effectively by discouraging forum shopping and
the parental kidnapping it entails.
The freedom of parents from criminal and civil sanctions when
they abduct their children from the custody of the other parent or
guardian is a subject of concern to many and forms the basis of this
comment. The inconsistencies of custody jurisdiction and the resul-
tant forum shopping also are discussed in detail. Finally, possible
solutions are suggested.
II. Parental Rights as a Defense to Kidnapping Charges
Kidnapping legislation protects both parental custody rights and
children's personal liberty against infringement by third parties. The
legislation, however, does not protect children against actions of their
parents. Parental status has become an almost complete defense to
charges of kidnapping and related crimes.
The Federal Kidnapping Act4 explicitly excludes parents from
its sanctions. The original 1932 Lindbergh Act5 imposed liability
only for interstate kidnapping for ransom. The Act was later revised
to include all cases of interstate kidnapping for the purpose of ran-
som, reward, or "other unlawful purpose."' When the House Judici-
ary Committee discussed the proposed revision, concern was ex-
pressed that this language would lead to the prosecution of parents
who take their children across state lines in defiance of custody
decrees or to avoid jurisdiction. 7 In response, Congress specifically
exempted parents from the Act's operation. 8
Furthermore, parental immunity has been implied when not
explicit in state kidnapping statutes. Burns v. Commonwealth,9 an
early decision favoring parents, held that a Pennsylvania statute did
not prohibit parental abductions. 10  Kidnapping was viewed as a
3. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text infra.
4. 18U.S.C.§ 1201 (1971).
5. Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, §§ 1, 3, 47 Stat. 326.
6. Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 301, 48 Stat. 781, 782.
7. Hearings on H.R. 5657 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932); Note, The Problem of Parental Kidnapping, 10 Wyo. L.J. 225, 235
(1956).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1971).
9. 129 Pa. 138, 18 A. 756 (1889).
10. Commonwealth v. Myers, 146 Pa. 24, 23 A. 164 (1892), also is frequently




threat to parental custody rights, but not to children's personal liber-
ties. The court reasoned that the desires and claims of parents over
their children spring from nature and are not subject to kidnapping
legislation." The decision's weakness is that it provided no protec-
tion against an abducting parent for the child or for the other parent.
Other jurisdictions similarly have exempted parents from criminal
kidnapping sanctions. Courts frequently refer to the natural desire of
parents to exercise control and custody over their children. " Kid-
napping charges are often dismissed under this reasoning for lack of
unlawful intent.'" Other courts find no harm in the parental ac-
tion. 14 These courts view kidnapping as a crime against the parents
and see the harm in the "malice and greed of the kidnapper"" and
the "mental anguish"' 6 of the parent. None of these decisions,
however, expresses concern for the personal rights of the child. An-
other judicial analysis supporting parental immunity is the rights-
duties approach to child custody.17 Absent a court decree to the con-
trary, courts frequently hold both parents to have equal rights in their
children.' Separated parents retain custody rights and can exercise
them with impunity. 9 Even violation of temporary custody decrees
will not result in criminal liability because these decrees do not
11. Burns v. Commonwealth, 129 Pa. 138, 145, 18 A. 756, 757 (1889). The
court held that the Pennsylvania statute was "enacted to protect parental and other
lawful custody of children against the greed and malice of the kidnapper, not to pun-
ish their natural guardian for asserting his claim to the possession and control of
them."
12. E.g., Wilbom v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 830, 337 P.2d 65, 66
(1959); State v. Elliott, 171 La. 306, 311, 131 So. 28, 30 (1930); People v. Nelson,
322 Mich. 262, 268, 33 N.W.2d 786, 788 (1948); State v. Switzer, 80 Ohio L. Abs.
12, 157 N.E.2d 466 (Findlay Mun. Ct. 1956).
13. E.g., People v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 262, 33 N.W.2d 786 (1948); State v.
Switzer, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 12, 157 N.E.2d 466 (Findlay Mun. Ct. 1956).
14. E.g., Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 337 P.2d 65 (1959); State
v. Brandenberg, 232 Mo. 531, 134 S.W. 529 (1911); State v. Switzer, 80 Ohio L.
Abs. 12, 157 N.E.2d 466 (Findlay Mun. Ct. 1956).
15. See, e.g., State v. Elliott, 171 La. 306, 311, 131 So. 28, 30 (1930); Com-
monwealth v. Myers, 146 Pa. 24, 30, 23 A. 164, 170 (1892).
16. E.g., Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 830, 337 P.2d 65, 66
(1959); State v. Brandenberg, 232 Mo. 531, 537, 134 S.W. 529, 530 (1911).
17. See note 1 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the rights and
duties of custody.
18. State v. Dewey, 155 Iowa 469, 471, 136 N.W. 533, 534 (1912); State v.
Angel, 42 Kan. 216, 222, 21 P. 1075, 1077 (1889); People v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 262,
268, 33 N.W,2d 786, 788 (1948); State v. Huhn, 346 Mo. 695, 698, 142 S.W.2d 1064,
1067 (1940); People v. Workman, 94 Misc. 374, 157 N.Y.S. 594 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
19. People v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 262, 33 N.W.2d 786 (1948); State v. Powe,
107 Miss. 770, 66 So. 207 (1914); State v. Hugn, 346 Mo. 695, 142 S.W.2d 1064
(1940); Commonwealth v, Myers, 146 Pa. 24,23 A. 164 (1892).
terminate parental custody rights.2"
A court decree conferring permanent custody generally will
subject an abducting parent to kidnapping charges.2 In a leading
Colorado case the court held that a custody decree divests a parent of
all rights and subjects him to the same liability as a third party.22 A
parent with a continuing duty of support, however, can claim immun-
ity under the rights-duties reasoning accepted by most courts even
when subject to an adverse decree of permanent custody.
However convincing the reasons for granting parental immunity
to criminal charges may be, they cannot justify the treatment of agents
of abducting parents. The agent generally is accorded the same
immunity as his principal, the parent.2" This delegation of parental
custody rights is inappropriate because of their fundamental nature.
These rights, described as essential to society and as antedating the
legal process,2 4 lose their unique character when delegated to an
agent.25 Criminal immunity for agents also is inconsistent with the
reasoning that parents are immune because their actions do not cause
the custodial parent anxiety about the child's welfare. When an
agent or a third party abducts a child, the same degree of anxiety is
aroused in the custodial parent." This inconsistency was recognized
in a California decision 7 that held nondelegable any right a parent
may have to take or entice his children away because of the grief
inflicted upon the custodial parent.28 Michigan has adopted a slight-
20. Adams v. State, 218 Ga. 130, 126 S.E.2d 624 (1962); State v. Switzer, 80
Ohio L. Abs. 12,157 N.E.2d 466 (Findlay Mun. Ct. 1956).
21. Parents were found guilty following an adverse decree in these decisions:
Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 127 P. 1023 (1912); State v. Crafton, 15 Ohio App.
2d 160, 239 N.E.2d 571 (1968). Parents were found not guilty in these cases be-
cause of a lack of a decree: State v. Dewey, 155 Iowa 469, 136 N.W. 533 (1912);
State v. Elliott, 171 La. 306, 131 So. 28 (1930); People v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 262,
33 N.W.2d 786 (1948); State v. Huhn, 346 Mo. 695, 142 S.W.2d 1064 (1940); Peo-
ple v. Workman, 94 Misc. 374, 157 N.Y.S. 594 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
22. Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 511, 127 P. 1023, 1024 (1912). The court
also noted that criminal liability was necessary since contempt proceedings are futile
when the abducting parent has fled the state. See notes 50-65 and accompanying
text infra.
23. E.g., State v. Dewey, 155 Iowa 469, 136 N.W. 533 (1912); State v. Angel,
42 Kan. 216, 21 P. 1075 (1889); State v. Elliott, 171 La. 306, 131 So. 28 (1930);
People v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 262, 33 N.W.2d 786 (1948); People v. Workman, 94
Misc. 374, 157 N.Y.S. 594 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Commonwealth v. Myers, 146 Pa. 24,
23 A. 164 (1892).
24. See note 1 supra.
25. The court relied on this reasoning in State v. Brandenberg, 232 Mo. 531,
134 S.W. 529 (1911).
26. Note, The Problem of Parental Kidnapping, 10 Wyo. L.J. 225, 229 (1956).
27. Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 337 P.2d 65 (1959); accord,
State v. Brandenberg, 232 Mo. 531, 134 S.W. 529 (1911).
28. In that case the parent accompanied his agent in the taking of the child.
The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would put parents at the mercy of strangers
claiming to be agents and would jeopardize the interests of parents, children, and the
public. Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 830, 337 P.2d 65, 66 (1959).
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ly different rule: agents are immune if they act in the presence of the
parent and the child is turned over promptly to the parent."9 Appli-
cation of agency theory to parental kidnappings emphasizes the
courts' insensitivity to the interests of abducted children. The
child experiences great fear and danger when his abductor is un-
known to him. Following this reasoning, a Missouri court refused
to delegate parental immunity to agents. 30 The court ruled that the
"cloak of parental affection" that justifies parental immunity is ab-
sent from the activities of an agent. The agent has no natural obli-
gation or inclination to care for the child properly. 31
Kidnapping of children by their parents entails the same in-
fringement of personal liberty and infliction of trauma upon the
guardian as a kidnapping by a third party. It, therefore, should be
subject to criminal sanctions. The special vulnerability of children to
kidnapping and the gravity of the crime is often recognized in state
prohibitions of child stealing and interference with custody. These
states can better serve the interests of children and parents by elimi-
nating the kidnapping immunities granted abducting parents.
III. Civil Liability for Parental Kidnapping
In most states parental immunity still exists and bars any suit by
an unemancipated child against an abducting parent. 2 Parental
immunity was unknown at common law, first appearing in the United
States in 1891.11 The conventional justifications for parental im-
munity are preservation of the family unit and maintenance of societal
29. People v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 262, 33 N.W.2d 786 (1948).
30. State v. Brandenberg, 232 Mo. 531, 134 S.W. 529 (1911).
31. Id. at 537, 134 S.W. at 530.
32. Parental immunity was abrogated in the following cases: Hebel v. Hebel,
435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970);
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Tamashiro
v. DeGama, 51 Hawaii 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App.
2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970);
Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Briere v. Briere, 107
N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); France v. APA Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267
A.2d 490 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Falco v. Pados,
444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d
193 (1963); 7 CALIF. WEsT L. REv. 466 (1971); 76 DIcK. L. REv. 623 (1972).
33. Three cases, Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); McKel-
vey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash.
242, 79 P. 788 (1905), created the foundation for parental tort immunity in the
United States.
peace. 4  The state as parens patriae is often said to have an interest
in family preservation 35 because a secure family unit is in the best
interest of the child. 36  Allowing interfamilial tort recoveries is
thought to be a decaying influence upon family solidarity.37
Thirteen states have rejected this family harmony reasoning and
have abolished parental immunity.38 Disruption of the family unit is
caused by the injury, not the recovery."a When the tort is a negligent
one and the parent carries liability insurance, recovery promotes
reconciliation. If a child has been intentionally harmed, on the other
hand, there is no family solidarity to protect.4" The occurrence of an
intentional tort belies the image of a harmonious family and denial of
recovery is purposeless.
41
Thus, in those states in which parental immunity has been
abrogated, a child conceivably can sue his abducting parent for false
imprisonment and assault.42  Recovery, however, is unlikely. Al-
though the action is intentional, it is not intended to harm the child,
but to end the custody of the other parent or to avoid the jurisdiction
of a court. The action is taken to provide what the abducting parent
believes to be the best environment for the child. Furthermore, a
hesitancy still exists on the part of the judiciary to interfere with
family solidarity.43 Parents continue to be afforded wide discretion
in the maintenance of family discipline and administration. 44  A
34. E.g., Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) (the leading case
upholding parental immunity in Pennsylvania before its abrogation); 19 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 681 (1958).
35. See, e.g., Mesite v. Kirschstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Man-
nion v. Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc. 68, 129 A. 431 (Cir. Ct. Hudson 1925).
36. E.g., Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Tucker v.
Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964).
37. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
An emancipated child is able to bring suit against his parents in states with
parental immunity because there is no family unity to protect. Murphy v. Murphy,
206 Misc. 228, 133 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1954); see, e.g., Martens v. Martens, 11
N.J. Misc. 705, 167 A. 227 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383,
57 A.2d 426 (1948).
38. Cases cited note 32 supra.
39. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 379, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971).
40. Id.; accord, Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 312, 135 A.2d 65, 79 (Musmanno,
J., dissenting).
41. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 379, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971); see Mahke
v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Brown v. Selby, 206 Tenn. 71, 332
S.W.2d 166 (1960) (allowing recovery for intentional torts on this theory).
42. Cases cited note 32 supra indicate the states in which parental immunity
has been abolished.
43. See Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 387, 282 A.2d 351, 357 (1971).
44. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the
State, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 410 (1970); see note 1 and accompanying text supra for a dis-
cussion of the deference accorded parental custody. Some states even aid parents in
disciplining their children by statutes allowing judicial interference in cases of contin-
ued insubordination. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1972); MASS.




child's removal from the control of the other parent probably will be
construed as within the realm of proper parental discretion. Recent
evidence of such a lenient judicial policy is provided by the treatment
of parents who abducted their children from religious colonies.
4"
Parental abductions also can give rise to civil liability between
parents. Theoretically such actions might involve the tort of inten-
tional infliction of mental distress and include recovery for loss of the
minor's services. Even in a state maintaining interspousal immuni-
ty,46 a cause of action may exist for wrongful abduction against a
parent who has given up child custody by agreement or abandon-
ment 7 or who has lost custody by a court decree. 48  This theory
45. National attention was focused on parental kidnapping recently because of
several attempts by parents to regain custody of their teen-aged children after they
had joined conservative religious societies. A particular agent was employed to effect
"rescues" that usually were forcible and conducted in the parents' presence. The res-
cues were followed by confinement of the youths for several days during which time
a program of reeducation was used to remove the religious indoctrination they had
received. The few charges that were brought were dropped or grand juries refused
to indict. In several cases police refused to register complaints because they consid-
ered the parents' actions to be "family squabbles." The agent was acquitted in the
one case that reached Manhattan criminal court. He defended on an agency theory.
Note, Abduction, Religious Sects and the Free Exercise Guarantee, 25 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 623 (1974); Roiphe, Struggle over Two Sisters, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1973, §
6 (Magazine), at 16; id., March 5, 1973, at 1, col. 2; id., June 19, 1973, at 33, col.
1; id. Aug. 7, 1973, at 24, col. 5; TIME, March 12, 1973, at 83.
46. Twenty-two states have abrogated interspousal immunity: Johnson v. John-
son, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alas. 1963);
Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931); Self v. Self, 58 Cal.
2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d
740 (1935); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Lorang v. Hays, 69
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953);
Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971); Beaudette v. Frana, 285
Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657
(1915); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); Coster v. Coster, 289
N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943) (also by statute in New York); Foster v. Foster,
264 N.C. 694, 142 S.E.2d 638 (1965) (also by statute in North Carolina); Fitzmau-
rice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Catron v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 434 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1967); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E.
787 (1920); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Juaire v. Juaire,
128 Vt. 142, 259 A.2d 786 (1969); Suratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d
200 (1971); Nelson v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 258 Wis. 252, 45 N.W.2d 681
(1951) (also by statute in Wisconsin).
Interspousal immunity was specifically upheld by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in Digirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382 (1973).
47. Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 78 S.E. 222 (1913); Clark v. Bayer, 32
Ohio St. 299 (1877); Moritz v. Garnhart, 7 Watts 302 (Pa. 1838).
48. Rice v. Nickerson, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 478 (1864); Pickle v. Page, 252
N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930); Note, The Problem of Parental Kidnapping, 10
Wyo. L.J. 225, 237 (1956).
This theory has support in the Pennsylvania statute that provides that although
parents have equal rights to child custody, a parent loses that right upon desertion
parallels criminal law in that following termination of custody rights,
a parent has the same criminal liability as any third party.49
IV. Contempt Proceedings for Defiant Parents
Parents who have removed or detained their children in defiance
of custody decrees have been held in civil contempt." Civil con-
tempt is used to compel compliance with a court decree, rather than
to impose punishment. 5' A parent may be subject to a fine and
imprisonment when charged with civil contempt, but these imposi-
tions must be conditioned upon continuing noncompliance with the
decree."z
Unfortunately, civil contempt charges are unlikely to be an
effective deterrent to parental kidnapping. 53  In most situations the
child is removed from the state in search of a more favorable custody
decree. A court cannot enforce its contempt order beyond the bor-
ders of the state; the extradition process is not available for civil
contempt. A state court has no mechanism, therefore, to reach
parents who have transported their children across state lines in
or failure of parental duties. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 91 (1965). Another sup-
portive statute is the one providing that a deserted wife can sue her husband upon
any cause of action. Id. § 114.
49. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
50. Bergen v. Bergen, 439 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1971); In re Guardianship of
Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966); Ex parte Memmi, 80 Cal. App. 2d
295, 181 P.2d 885 (2d Dist. 1947); Smith v. Smith, 4 Terry 268, 45 A.2d 879 (Del.
1946); Kemp v. Kemp, 206 A.2d 731 (D.C. App. 1965); Coles v. Coles, 202 A.2d
394 (D.C. App. 1964); Winter v. Crowley, 245 Md. 313, 226 A.2d 304 (1967);
Aufiero v. Aufiero, 332 Mass. 149, 123 N.E.2d 709 (1955); Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88
N.H. 223, 186 A. 1 (1936); Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 336 (1968);
Commonwealth ex rel. Beghian v. Beghian, 408 Pa. 408, 184 A.2d 270 (1962); Cox
v. Cox, 391 Pa. 572, 137 A.2d 779 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Sage v. Sage, 160
Pa. 399, 28 A. 863 (1894); Commonwealth ex rel. Lawry v. Reed, 59 Pa.
425 (1868); Commonwealth v. Weigley, 4 Pa. D. & C. 633 (C.P. Som. 1923), appeal
quashed, Commonwealth ex rel. Wilhelm v. Weigley, 83 Pa. Super. 189 (1924);
Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489, 208 S.W.2d 876 (1948); Brooks v. Brooks, 131 Vt. 86,
300 A.2d 531 (1973).
In one case criminal contempt was brought by the State. Kenimer v. State, 81
Ga. App. 437, 59 S.E.2d 296 (1950).
51. 'United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947); United States ex rel.
Carter v. Jennings, 333 F. Supp. 1392, 1395 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Knaus v. Knaus, 387
Pa. 370, 376, 127 A.2d 669, 672 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel. Lieberman v. Lewis,
253 Pa. 175, 181, 98 A. 31, 38 (1916). These cases set forth the distinction between
criminal contempt, which is punitive, and civil contempt, which is remedial. Crim-
inal contempt is lodged to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court and to
protect the public interest. Civil contempt is aimed at enforcing compliance with a
court decree. Any vindication of a court's authority through civil contempt is merely
incidental.
52. Bergen v. Bergen, 439 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1971); Kemp v. Kemp, 206 A.2d
731 (D.C. App. 1965); Coles v. Coles, 202 A.2d 394 (D.C. App. 1964); Common-
wealth ex rel. Beghian v. Beghian, 408 Pa. 408, 184 A.2d 270 (1962).





violation of a custody decree.54 In Rosin v. Superior Court55 a
California court found a parent in contempt, but noted that "jurisdic-
tion is gone for all practical purposes when the children are living in
another state, for no effective order can be made modifying the
custody provisions of the decree."56 The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has faced this problem from the opposite perspective. In
Commonwealth ex rel. Sage v. Sage57 the court held that it could not
compel a Pennsylvania resident who harbored her child in defiance of
a New Jersey custody decree to return to New Jersey and submit
herself to civil contempt proceedings.
58
State courts disagree about the effect of a subsequent out-of-
state custody decree on a contempt order of the original state. In
Brooks v. Brooks59 the Vermont Supreme Court declared that a
Vermont contempt order remained valid even though superseded by a
California custody decree. In contrast, Brocker v. Brocker,60 a re-
cent Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decision, held that a parent who
detained his child in Ohio in defiance of a Pennsylvania decree could
purge himself of contempt by proof of a subsequent Ohio decree in
his favor."' In Bergen v. Bergen 2 a Virgin Islands court set aside a
contempt order issued within that jurisdiction against a parent who
defied a custody decree by taking his child to New York for a
reopening of the custody issue. Deferring to interstate comity, the
court recognized New York's jurisdiction and remanded the case for
findings that would justify disregarding the parent's invocation of that
54. Rosin v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 2d 486, 5 Cal. Rptr. 421 (2d Dist.
1960); People ex rel. Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 51, 27 P.2d 1038, 1039
(1933); Winter v. Crowley, 245 Md. 313, 226 A.2d 304 (1967); Commonwealth ex
rel. Beghian v. Beghian, 408 Pa. 408, 184 A.2d 270 (1962).
The Supreme Court of Colorado in People ex rel. Wagner v. Torrence, supra
at 51, 27 P.2d at 1039, acknowledged the weakness of the civil contempt process in
child custody matters. The contempt order itself reveals that the children are beyond
the jurisdiction of the court that issued the custody decree.
55. 181 Cal. App. 2d 486, 5 Cal. Rptr. 421 (2d Dist. 1960).
56. Id. at 499, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 429. This holding recognized that the majority
of state courts will reopen custody determinations on the mere physical presence of
the child within the state. See notes 74-79 and accompanying text infra.
57. 160 Pa. 399, 28 A. 863 (1894).
58. Id. at 405-06, 28 A. at 864. The court did hold, however, that interstate
comity required it to turn the child over to the New Jersey parent who sought a writ
of habeas corpus in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, in recent cases Pennsylvania courts
have reopened custody disputes rather than defer to the principle of comity. See
notes 104-08 and accompanying text infra.
59. 131Vt. 86, 300 A.2d 531 (1973).
60. 429 Pa. 513,241 A.2d 336 (1968).
61. Id. at 532, 241 A.2d at 345. (Roberts, J., concurring).
62. 439 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1971).
jurisdiction.63 This decision is consistent with the Pennsylvania view
that contempt proceedings are inappropriate following a superseding
custody decree in another jurisdiction in favor of the contemptuous
parent.
6 4
Civil contempt proceedings are an effective remedy to parental
kidnapping only when the abducting parent remains within the state.
Even if contempt orders are considered to survive a later custody
decree of another state,65 no mechanism exists by which defiant
parents can be compelled to return.
V. Custody Jurisdiction: Encouragement of Parental Kidnapping
Parental kidnapping most often occurs when parents have sepa-
rated and both desire custody of the child. Since states disagree on
the basis for jurisdiction over custody disputes, 66 concurrent jurisdic-
tion often exists and forum shopping becomes feasible. The states'
failure to grant full faith and credit to custody decrees of other states
also encourages parental kidnappings.
6 7
A. Bases of Jurisdiction
States use one of three bases of original jurisdiction over custody
disputes: 68 domicile of the child, residence of the child, or personal
jurisdiction over both parents. Domicile is the strictest standard
because it requires the greatest degree of permanence. Domicile is
defined as the place with which one has the most settled connection
and considers to be "home."69  Children are deemed unable to
choose a domicile until they are emancipated. By operation of law
they take the domicile of their father at birth. 71 When parents
separate, the children assume the domicile of the parent with whom
they live or with whom the court places them. 71  Only a few states
require that a child be domiciled within their borders before they will
exercise jurisdiction in custody disputes.72  Parents are least likely to
63. Id. at 1014.
64. Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 336 (1969).
65. Brooks v. Brooks, 131 Vt. 86, 300 A.2d 531 (1973).
66. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948), is a fre-
quently cited case that set down three bases of jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971); Comment, The Full Faith and Credit Clause
and Its Relation to Custody Decrees, 11 ALA. L. REv. 139 (1958).
67. See notes 87-96 and accompanying text infra.
68. See note 66 supra.
69. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.1,
at 144 (1968).
70. Id. § 4.3, at 151.
71. Id.
72. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 105 Ariz. 273, 463 P.2d 71 (1969); Johnson v. John-
son, 105 Ariz. 233, 462 P.2d 782 (1969); Stallings v. Bass, 204 Ga. 3, 48 S.E.2d
822 (1948); Tureson v. Tureson, 281 Minn. 107, 160 N.W.2d 552 (1968); Ex parte
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forum shop in these states because an intent to remain must be shown
to establish a domicile. Forum shopping is especially discouraged
after a decree has been issued elsewhere since removal of a child in
violation of a custody decree does not change his domicile.
7 3
The majority of states accept residence, a physical presence
within the state, as an adequate basis for jurisdiction.74 Willingness
to accept such a meager basis is founded in the concept of parens
patriae.75 Once a child is present within the state, the state has a vital
interest in that child's welfare.' Courts have held that the exercise
of jurisdiction in cases of minors' welfare is an unavoidable duty
stemming from parens patriae.7 In the leading decision Judge (later
Justice) Cardozo wrote,
The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody of infants
found within its territory does not depend upon the domicile of
the parents. It has its origin in the protection that is due to the
incompetent or helpless. [citations omitted] For this, the resi-
dence of the child suffices, though the domicile be elsewhere.78
This inclination to grant jurisdiction on mere physical presence,
coupled with the tendency of courts to favor local petitioners, encour-
ages forum shopping by abducting parents.
79
Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAws § 79 (1971).
73. Chamblee v. Rose, 249 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1952).
74. E.g., In re Guardianship of Smythe, 65 Ill. App. 2d 431, 213 N.E.2d 609
(1965); Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1967); Neal v. Neal, 217 So.
2d 639 (Miss. 1969); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925); In re
Fore, 168 Ohio St. 363, 155 N.E.2d 194 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 313 (1959);
Commonwealth ex rel. Scholtes v. Scholtes, 187 Pa. Super. 22, 142 A.2d 345 (1958);
State ex rel. Van Loh v. Prosser, 78 S.D. 35, 98 N.W.2d 329 (1959); Wicks v. Cox,
146 Tex. 489, 208 S.W.2d 876 (1948); Falco v. Grills, 209 Va. 115, 161 S.E.2d 713
(1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
75. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
76. Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 367 Pa. 553, 80 A.2d 829
(1951); In re Wilkin's Estate, 146 Pa. 585, 23 A. 325 (1892); Coombs v. Coombs,
225 Pa. Super. 304, 303 A.2d 498 (1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Mason v. Mason,
213 Pa. Super. 433, 249 A.2d 922 (1968); Commonwealth ex rel. Scholtes v.
Scholtes, 187 Pa. Super. 22, 142 A.2d 345 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Carson
v. Carson, 20 Chest. 26 (Pa. C.P. 1971); Commonwealth ex rel. D'Ercole v. Barnes,
86 Pa. D. & C. 509 (C.P. Lawr. 1953).
77. Commonwealth ex rel. Scholtes v. Scholtes, 187 Pa. Super. 22, 142 A.2d
345 (1958).
78. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925).
79. E.g., In re Irizarry's Custody, 195 Pa. Super. 104, 169 A.2d 307 (1961).
In that case children awarded to their father in Puerto Rico were visiting their
mother in Philadelphia. The Philadelphia county court exercised custody jurisdiction
after only thirteen days. In Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416,
148 A. 524 (1930), the Pennsylvania court exercised jurisdiction over children
brought before it in violation of another state's court order. Foster, Domestic Rela-
The third basis for custody jurisdiction is in personam jurisdic-
tion over the contesting parties, the parents.80 States with this basis
for jurisdiction will grant a custody hearing regardless of the resi-
dence or domicile of the child. This position is supported by the
Supreme Court's decision that custody decrees issued without person-
al jurisdiction over both parents are invalid and may be reopened at a
later time.8' The natural parental right to custody was central in
that decision. Since custody rights are personal rights, the Court held
that a parent may not be deprived of them by a court without
personal jurisdiction.82 This jurisdictional basis discourages parents
from subjecting themselves willingly to the jurisdiction of out-of-state
courts, thus complicating the problems of nonfinality of decrees and
insecurity for the child.
Some courts give token recognition to the continuing, concurrent
jurisdiction of the state rendering the original custody decree."8 This
recognition becomes meaningless, however, when the second state
reopens the case on the merits. Washington and Wisconsin have
tions, 1960-1961 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 23 U. Prrr. L. REV. 465, 476 (1961);
Fox, Domestic Relations, 1963-1964 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 26 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 363, 377 (1964); Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MIcH. L. REV.
795, 807 (1964).
80. Pope v. Pope, 239 Ark. 352, 389 S.W.2d 425 (1965); Sharpe v. Sharpe,
77 Ill. App. 2d 295, 222 N.E.2d 340 (1966); Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828
(Ky. 1967); Green v. Green, 351 Mass. 466, 221 N.E.2d 857 (1966); Weiler v.
Weiler, 331 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. App. 1960); Jackson v. Jackson, 241 S.C. 1, 126 S.E.2d
855 (1962); Gramelspacher v. Gramelspacher, 204 Va. 839, 134 S.E.2d 285 (1964);
Brazy v. Brazy, 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W.2d 738 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
81. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). A custody decree that was part
of a Wisconsin ex parte divorce was held subject to reopening by the absent parent
in another state. The Court held that the decree was as severable from the divorce
as an alimony award would be. Id. at 534.
82. Id. at 534. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion pointed out that the
majority's approach amounted to treating children as chattels. He stressed that chil-
dren also have a personal right at stake: the right to have their status determined
with reasonable certainty. Id. at 542.
83. E.g., Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77 Ill. App. 2d 295, 297, 222 N.E.2d 340, 342
(1966); Berlin v. Berlin, 239 *Md. 52, 210 A.2d 380 (1965); Harris v. Harris, 50
Pa. D. & C.2d 728 (C.P. Bucks 1970); Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 174 P.2d
790 (1946); Zillmer v. Zilimer, 8 Wis. 2d 657, 100 N.W.2d 564 (1960). In Sharpe
v. Sharpe, supra, the court held that its continuing jurisdiction should be recognized
even when a new domicile is established for the child in another state. In favoring
single court jurisdiction the court chose continuity over propinquity to give stability
to both children and the courts by the avoidance of forum shopping. Id. at 297, 222
N.E.2d at 342.
Pennsylvania, prominent among the states refusing to grant full faith and credit
to decrees of other states, has recommended that other states recognize its continuing
jurisdiction in custody determinations. In Harris v. Harris, supra, the court asserted
continuing jurisdiction over children who had been removed to Georgia after the issu-
ance of a Pennsylvania decree. The court reasoned that "[tjo reach a contrary re-
sult would put a premium upon 'legalized kidnapping' by one parent of his child or
children when that parent does not wish to be scrutinized by the court and examined




been leaders in recognizing the continuing jurisdiction of the state
that issued the original custody decree.84 Courts in both states
actively discourage parental abductions by refusing to exercise juris-
diction unless a new domicile has been established for the child within
the state's borders.8 5 Adoption of this policy by other states will limit
interstate abductions."8
B. Full Faith and Credit
Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution mandates
that full faith and credit shall be provided for the judicial determina-
tions of each and every state.87  Full faith and credit, however, is not
generally accorded to child custody decrees. A commonly stated
reason for this exception is that by their nature custody decrees are
not res judicata.88 Even permanent custody decrees are subject to
modification. This flexibility stems from a recognition that child
welfare is paramount and that the circumstances that contribute to it
are not static. A custody determination will be reopened when there
84. Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946); Ziimer v. Zill-
mer, 8 Wis. 2d 657, 100 N.W.2d 564 (1960).
85. In Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 426, 174 P.2d 790, 800 (1946), the
court refused jurisdiction because the children were still domiciled in Ohio. The
court defined domicile to include presence and an intent to remain permanently. Id.
at 444, 174 P.2d at 804. See notes 69-73 and accompanying text supra for a discus-
sion of domicile as a standard for jurisdiction. In Zillmer v. Zillmer, 8 Wis. 2d 657,
663, 100 N.W.2d 564, 567 (1960), the Wisconsin court similarly deferred to Kansas
since most information regarding the children was available there, although the chil-
dren had been living in Wisconsin with their grandparents.
86. But see A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 299
(1962), in which it is suggested that recognizing the decrees of other states disregards
the immediate welfare of the child. Although Professor Ehrenzweig recognized that
a flexible approach to comity causes interstate abductions, he proposed congressional
action to standardize jurisdictional criteria.
87. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Enabling legislation is found at § 1738 of the Judicial
Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1971).
88. E.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979
(D.C. Cir. 1945); In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744
(1966); Stout v. Pate, 120 Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (2d Dist. 1953); Smith
v. Smith, 43 Del. 268, 45 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1946); Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers
v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930); Commonwealth ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey,
216 Pa. Super. 332, 264 A.2d 420 (1970); Proctor v. Proctor, 213 Pa. Super. 171,
245 A.2d 684 (1968); Commonwealth ex rel. Dinsmore v. Dinsmore, 198 Pa. Super.
480, 182 A.2d 66 (1962); Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa.
Super. 631, 98 A.2d 437 (1953); Anderson v. Anderson, 36 Wis. 2d 455, 153 N.W.2d
627 (1967).
has been a change of circumstances that may affect the welfare of the
child.89 Generally the burden of proving a change in circumstances
is easily met."0 Ironically this concern for child welfare encourages
parental abductions. Since custody decrees may be modified in the
issuing jurisdiction, courts in other states reason that they too may
reopen the issue.9'
Although child welfare is a noble goal, it is not so qualitatively
unique to merit an exception to the full faith and credit clause. 92
States honor the policy of full faith and credit in other areas that
involve fundamental rights of liberty and property. 9 If parental
kidnapping is to be stopped, there must be recognition of interstate
comity. This recognition is logical in child custody matters. Every
state has the same fundamental concern in custody determinations-
child welfare.94 Every state uses approximately the same considera-
tions to determine child welfare. 95 No reason exists, therefore, for
failure to grant full faith and credit to custody determinations absent
a significant change in circumstances subsequent to the initial decree.
Even under changed circumstances comity would suggest application
for modification in the court of the original decree. Recognition of
foreign state custody decrees ultimately will best serve the interests of
child welfare.96
89. E.g., In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966);
In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243 (5th Dist. 1964); Boardman
v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521 (1948); Smith v. Smith, 43 Del. 268, 45
A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1946); Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866, 154
N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956); Friedman v. Friedman, 224 Pa. Super. 530, 307 A.2d 292
(1973); Proctor v. Proctor, 213 Pa. Super. 171, 245 A.2d 684 (1968); Common-
wealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 98 A.2d 437 (1953).
90. A. EHR-ENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 289-90 (1962).
91. Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930);
Commonwealth ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 216 Pa. Super. 332, 264 A.2d 420 (1970);
Proctor v. Proctor, 213 Pa. Super. 171, 245 A.2d 684 (1968); Commonwealth ex rel.
Dinsmore v. Dinsmore, 198 Pa. Super. 480, 182 A.2d 66 (1962); Commonwealth ex
rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 98 A.2d 437 (1953).
92. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REv. 795, 798
(1964).
93. E.g., Magnolia Petro. Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) (workmen's com-
pensation); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (child support).
94. E.g., Casteel v. Casteel, 45 N.J. Super. 338, 353, 132 A.2d 529, 538
(1957). In this case the New Jersey court relied upon a statute that prohibited re-
moval of minor domiciliaries from the state for reasons other than the child's best
interests. The court held that full faith and credit still permitted a state to enforce
its own policies. Id. at 354, 132 A.2d at 538.
95. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §
17.4, at 584 (1968).
96. Fox, Domestic Relations, 1963-1964 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 26 U.
PIr. L. REv. 363, 377 (1964):
Whereas kidnapping is a federal crime, the state courts' refusal to give full
faith and credit to their sister states' custody decrees appears to encourage,
and often to reward, the 'legalized abduction' of one's child, i.e., a parent's
taking of the child from one jurisdiction and obtaining 'lawful' custody of
him in another.




Courts that reopen child custody decrees often do so even when
the child has been brought before them through ruse, trick, violation
of a decree, or other misconduct. 7 Although these courts draw their
authority from equity, they fail to apply the essential equitable princi-
ple of "clean hands."98 The principle declares that he who seeks
equity must do so with clean hands; equity will not condone inequita-
ble conduct by the petitioner.99 Abducting parents seem to be im-
mune, however, from this limitation in custody disputes. 100
The typical justification for failure to apply the clean hands
doctrine in custody determinations is that it would be improper to
REV. 465, 476 (1961), also commented on the encouragement of legalized abduction
by the current majority position on full faith and credit.
97. E.g., Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1945). In that case a
child was detained in the District of Columbia in violation of a Maryland decree.
The court reopened the case and emphasized its rejection of the clean hands princi-
ple by stating that the Maryland decree was improper because the Maryland court
had invoked the doctrine in its decision. The court declared that any disciplinary
action for the parent's misconduct was left to the "proper authorities." Id. at 983.
Other courts have reached similar decisions: In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100
Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966) (mother took child from father's rightful custody
in Texas); In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243 (5th Dist. 1964)
(mother took child and was charged by Texas with kidnapping; California refused
extradition); Smith v. Smith, 43 Del. 268, 45 A.2d 879 (Super. Ct. 1946); Helton
v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W.2d 60 (1950); Aufiero v. Aufiero, 332 Mass.
149, 123 N.E.2d 709 (1955); Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 186 A. 1 (1936); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930); Wicks v. Cox,
146 Tex. 489, 208 S.W.2d 876 (1948).
98. J. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUJDENCE § 20, at 61 (2d ed. 1923).
99. A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 293 (1962);
Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 795, 798 (1964).
100. Pennsylvania is prominent among the states whose courts ignore the clean
hands principle in custody jurisdiction. Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298
Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930); Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 229 Pa. Super.
9, 323 A.2d 273 (1974); Reilly v. Reilly, 219 Pa. Super. 85, 280 A.2d 639 (1971);
Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Gillard, 203 Pa. Super. 95, 198 A.2d 377 (1964);
Commonwealth ex rel. Scholtes v. Scholtes, 187 Pa. Super. 22, 142 A.2d 345 (1958);
Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 98 A.2d 437
(1953); Commonwealth ex rel. Pukas v. Pukas, 164 Pa. Super. 488, 66 A.2d 315
(1949); Commonwealth ex rel. McTighe v. Lindsey, 156 Pa. Super. 560, 40 A.2d 881
(1945); Harris v. Harris, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 728 (C.P. Bucks 1970); Commonwealth
ex rel. D'Ercole v. Barnes, 86 Pa. D. & C. 509 (C.P. Lawr. 1953).
One Pennsylvania decision, Commonwealth ex rel. Beemer v. Beemer, 200 Pa.
Super. 103, 188 A.2d 475 (1962), recognized the clean hands doctrine. The superior
court denied an appeal to a mother for her "flagrant misconduct" in removing her
children from the jurisdiction prior to the lower court decision and in keeping them
after an adverse decision. Id. at 107, 188 A.2d at 477. The distinguishing circum-
stance in that case, however, was that the decree being defied was issued by a Penn-
sylvania court. Pennsylvania is not as responsive to violations of a sister state's de-
cree.
punish the innocent child for parental misconduct.'" Many courts
realize that they may be encouraging interstate abductions and that
ordinarily an individual should not be permitted to take advantage of
his own misconduct, but they contend that these considerations
should not bar a determination involving child welfare.1 2  Miscon-
duct is considered in these decisions only as an element in determin-
ing which parent should be awarded custody.11
3
Pennsylvania courts have excused abductions as instinctive
parental behavior.1"4 The superior court has said, "We do not feel
that this act of a mother seeking her children . . . is of such serious
consequences as to deprive her of her rights in them."'' In a 1953
decision a parent brought her children to Pennsylvania in defiance
of a Florida decree granting custody to the father. The court not
only condoned her action as the natural consequence of motherhood,
but ignored the Florida adjudication issued only five months before
the inquiry of the Philadelphia county court.0 6 Even more recently
the superior court found abductions by both parents to be "reprehen-
sible,"'1 7 but granted a hearing on the merits.
[I]n this type of case where parents attempt to outwit each
other in the possession and custody of their children, we will not
place much weight on the frailties of human nature, nor sub-
ordinate more important factors, especially since those -regret-
table acts on the part of the parents are in the past. 10 8
The sympathetic treatment often granted abducting parents is
exemplified by a California decision 0 9 in which that state refused to
extradite an abducting mother to Texas on a kidnapping charge. The
101. In In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 276, 413 P.2d 744, 749
(1966), the court addressed this point by stating, "Any other holding would punish
innocent children for the wrongs committed by their parents and would prevent the
inquiry to be made by the trial judge in determining where the best interests and wel-
fare of the child lie."
102. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 43 Del. 268, 274, 45 A.2d 879, 881 (Super.
Ct. 1946):
Ordinarily a man should not be permitted to take advantage of his own
wrong-doing, but this principle must not be allowed to interfere with the
basic rule that the child's welfare is the primary consideration in any case
involving its custody.
103. E.g., In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966);
Smith v. Smith, 135 Cal. App. 2d 100, 286 P.2d 1009 (1st Dist. 1955); Common-
wealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930); Commonwealth
ex rel. Scholtes v. Scholtes, 187 Pa. Super. 22, 142 A.2d 345 (1958); Commonwealth
ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 98 A.2d 437 (1953).
104. E.g., Bums v. Commonwealth, 129 Pa. 138, 18 A. 756 (1889).
105. Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 645, 98
A.2d 437, 443 (1953).
106. Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 98 A.2d
437 (1953).
107. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 229 Pa. Super. 9, 17, 323 A.2d
273, 276 (1974).
108. Id. at 14, 323 A.2d at 275.
109. In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243 (5th Dist. 1964).
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court then granted custody to the mother, reasoning that if it
awarded custody to the Texas father, the mother would be unable
to visit her children without risking criminal liability for the kidnap-
ping.110 California refused to grant full faith and credit to the Texas
decree, but also enabled the parent to sidestep criminal prosecution
while enjoying her custody rights.
Some jurisdictions do apply the clean hands principle, however,
and refuse to open custody determinations when the child is
brought before the court in defiance of another court's decree.'
Washington is a leader among these clean hands jurisdictions. In a
landmark decision, Ex parte Mullins,"2 the Washington Supreme
Court applied the principle, declaring that
[t]o hold otherwise would be to put a premium upon wrongdo-
ing by allowing a parent to gain an advantage by disobeying the
orders of a court.
All reasoning and ideas of fair play and justice de-
mand a holding that a parent acting in disobedience to an order
of a court, cannot secure a new domicile for his or her child."
3
D. Supreme Court Action
The efforts of individual states to limit forum shopping are
necessarily ineffective. The child custody jurisdiction problems aris-
ing from interstate parental kidnapping are federal in nature and
only a uniform, national policy can deal effectively with them.1 4 The
110. Id. at 225, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 248. The court also noted that invocation of
the clean hands doctrine is discretionary with the court.
111. E.g., Leathers v. Leathers, 162 Cal. App. 2d 768, 328 P.2d 853 (1958);
Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P.2d 311 (1950); Rodney v. Adams, 268
S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954); In re Leete, 205 Mo. App. 225, 223 S.W. 962 (1920); Wil-
son v. Elliott, 96 Tex. 472, 75 S.W. 368 (1903); Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419,
174 P.2d 790 (1946).
California is inconsistent on this point. Compare Leathers v. Leathers, supra,
with In re Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243 (5th Dist. 1964) (clean
hands doctrine recognized, but not invoked).
112. 26 Wash. 2d419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946).
113. Id. at 431,445, 174 P.2d at 797, 804.
114. For a discussion of the federal nature of the problem see Ratner, Child
Custody in a Federal System, 62 MIcH. L REV. 795 (1964); Stansbury, Custody and
Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 819 (1944). For
proposed federal solutions see Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1216 (1969) (uniform state legislation); Currie, Full
Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments, 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 89, 115 (action by Con-
gress); Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem, 38
S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 185 (1965) (uniform state legislation); Comment, Conflicting
Custody Decrees, 7 DUQ. L. REV. 262, 272 (1968) (action by the United States Su-
preme Court).
United States Supreme Court has failed to create this policy, how-
ever, and has sidestepped the issue of legalized parental kidnapping.
115
In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey" 6 the Court was presented
with defiance of a Florida custody decree and a subsequent New
York decree in favor of the defiant parent. The Court "in the
exercise of judicial restraint decided to decide as little as possible."
'"17
Instead of directly examining the full faith and credit issue, the Court
held that since the decree was modifiable in Florida, it also could be
modified in New York."" In his concurring opinion Justice Rut-
ledge admitted that this holding would encourage abductions, but
stated that the Court had done its best." 9
The problem again reached the Supreme Court in May v. An-
derson." The question was whether an Ohio court was bound to
extend full faith and credit to a Wisconsin custody decree that was
incident to a Wisconsin ex parte divorce. Again sidestepping the full
faith and credit issue, the Court based its decision on the impropriety
of Wisconsin's original jurisdiction since no personal jurisdiction had
been obtained over one of the parents. 2' The majority opinion by
Justice Burton held that parental custody was a personal right that
could not be taken without in personam jurisdiction over the par-
ent. 2  The effect of the decision, however, was to encourage parents
to avoid service of process and later attack the jurisdiction of the
court issuing a custody decree.' 2'
In Kovacs v. Brewer 24 the Court espoused the changed circum-
115. See Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 1207, 1216 (1969); Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments,
1964 Sup. CT. REV. 89, 115. In the latter the author wrote, "the Court is not going
to hold that custody decrees are entitled to full faith and credit." He further sug-
gested that such action by the Court would be improper, amounting to judicial legis-
lation. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
116. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
117. 'Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 795, 799
(1964).
118. 330 U.S. at 615.
119. Id. at 620-21.
120. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
121. Id. at 533.
122. Id.
123. Justice Jackson in his dissent, id. at 536, noted that the majority provided
no real solution because in this case neither state could bind both parents and the
decree would never achieve finality.
A state law such as this, where possession apparently is not merely nine
points of the law but all of them and self-help is the ultimate authority, has
little to commend it in legal logic or as a principle of order in a federal
system.
Id. at 539. Using the majority's personal rights analysis Justice Jackson also argued
that in addition to parents' personal custody rights, the child's personal right to have
his status determined with reasonable certainty was at stake in these cases. Id. at
541-42.
124. 356U.S. 604 (1958).
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stances theory that had been adopted by a majority of states. 12 5 The
Court found that the full faith and credit clause did not require a state
to follow another state's decree when a change of circumstances had
occurred. 126  Although the Kovacs majority refused to reject the full
faith and credit clause in custody cases, they rendered it ineffective.
127
Low levels of proof are required to show a change in circum-
stances. These changes have included the mere passage of time.128
As long as state courts make a token finding of changed circum-
stances, they have fulfilled the requirements of Kovacs and may ig-
nore the custody decrees of other states.' 29
Ford v. Ford,130 the High Court's most recent effort, again failed
to address the constitutional question directly. A Virginia court had
dismissed a custody case pursuant to a parental agreement. When
one of the parents sought to modify the agreement in South Carolina,
the custodial parent contended that the Virginia dismissal was bind-
ing and was upheld by the Supreme Court of South Carolina."' The
Supreme Court ruled, however, that the state court had misinterpret-
ed Virginia law in that dismissals in custody cases are not binding in
Virginia. 32  Relying on New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey"13 the
Court held the dismissal not binding in South Carolina."14  The
opinion did not indicate what the result would have been if the
dismissal had been binding in Virginia. Thus, the applicability of the
full faith and credit clause in custody determinations remains un-
clear.'
125. Id. at 608.
126. Id.
127. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, id. at 609, went beyond the majority and sug-
gested a complete rejection of full faith and credit in custody cases. He maintained
that the goal of interstate comity was secondary to that of child welfare. Studies
of custody determinations, however, have shown Justice Frankfurter's view of child
welfare to be somewhat shortsighted. Child welfare has not been best served by ig-
noring sister state custody decrees. Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family
Law Chaos, 45 U. VA. L. REv. 379, 380 (1959).
128. In the Kovacs case only fourteen months had passed since the initial cus-
tody decree. See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 819, 830 (1944).
129. See notes 89-91 and accompanying text supra for a more complete discus-
sion of the changed circumstances reasoning.
130. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
131. Ford v. Ford, 239 S.C. 305, 317, 123 S.E.2d 33, 39 (1961).
132. 371 U.S. at 192-93.
133. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
134. 371 U.S. at 193-94.
135. Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments, 1964 Sup. Cr. REv.
89, 112; Comment, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 282, 288
(1966). In Currie, supra at 112, the author wrote, "What is remarkable is that, at
Disagreement exists about the meaning of these Supreme Court
decisions. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws interprets
them to mean that full faith and credit is secondary to the national
policy of promoting child welfare. 1 6 Close examination of the opin-
ions' language, however, reveals that the Restatement view is not
entirely accurate. Although vague references to child welfare appear
in these decisions, the Justices did not carve an explicit exception to
the full faith and credit clause. 3 7 The Court consistently avoided the
constitutional question by finding qualifying facts that prevented
direct application of the clause.' Indeed, Justice Frankfurter pro-
posed the Restatement interpretation in his dissent to Kovacs v.
Brewer,' but the position was not adopted by the majority.
E. An Alternative: Uniform Legislation
Despite the failure of the Supreme Court to create a national
policy, an alternative exists in uniform legislation. 40 The Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,' 4 ' adopted by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association
in 1968, has been adopted by six states to date: California, Colorado,
Hawaii, North Dakota, Oregon, and Wyoming.' 42 The Act, which
provides for reciprocal recognition of custody decrees, will discourage
parental kidnapping when adopted by a majority of states. Under
the Act only one court has full responsibility for any particular
this late date, and despite the categorical language of the implementing act, the Court
still shuns a holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to a custody de-
cree."
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 434(c) (1971).
137. Comment, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 282, 287
(1966). But see Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 22
VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1211 (1969).
138. Comment, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 282, 288
(1966).
139. 356 U.S. 604, 609 (1958).
140. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 3 FAMILY L.Q.
304 (1969); Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 1207 (1969); Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody
Problem, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1965); Walther, The Uniform Child Custody Act,
54 MARQ. L. REV. 161 (1971).
Although Congress can take action under the full faith and credit clause, 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1971), it has chosen not to act, deferring instead to the Supreme
Court's interpretation. Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments, 1964
Sup. CT. REV. 89, 115; Comment, Conflicting Custody Decrees, 7 DUQ. L. REV. 262,
272 (1968). The latter commended congressional inaction because child custody is
so inherently related to state policy. As an alternative, the author suggested that the
Supreme Court establish standards. The Currie article, supra at 115, on the other
hand, argued that action by the Court would be improper judicial legislation.
14 1. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT.
142. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-74 (West Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46-6-1 to -26 (1973); HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26 (1973); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-14-01 to -26 (1969); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 109.700-.930 (1973); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 20-143 to -167 (1973).
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child.' 48 That court is one in the child's "home state."' 44 The home
state is the state in which the child lived with a parent or guardian for
six months immediately preceding the custody determination. A
home state's jurisdiction endures for six months after the child leaves
that state.' 45 This provision will greatly enhance the custodial
parent's protection against an abducting parent. Currently the vic-
timized parent is compelled to follow the abductor and file for habeas
corpus in whatever state to which the child is taken. Under the
Uniform Act, on the other hand, proceedings can be filed in the home
state for up to six months after the child is gone. When no state
qualifies as a home state, jurisdiction may be exercised by a state
having "strong contacts"'146 with the child. Strong contacts exist
under section 3(a)(3) when
(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one con-
testant, have a significant connection with this State and (ii)
there is available in this State substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care, protection, training, and per-
sonal relationships.
Mere physical presence is insufficient as a jurisdictional basis, except
in emergency situations when temporary measures may be taken by
the state in its role as parens patriae. Emergencies include abandon-
ment, neglect, and mistreatment.14
7
Once a court of jurisdiction is established under the Act, all
petitions for modification of the original custody order must be
addressed to that court. 48 This system provides for interstate comity
without any direct reference to the full faith and credit clause. One
of the most significant elements of the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act is adherence to the equitable principle of clean hands.
Under the Act courts will decline jurisdiction when the child has been
wrongfully taken from another state or wrongfully detained on a
visit. '4 Inequitable activity extends beyond illegal activity to any
conduct the court finds reprehensible. Furthermore, the clean hands
principle applies even when no official custody decree has been
rendered in any other state. Consistent with its equitable origins,
143. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT § 3.
144. Id. § 2(5).
145. Id. § 3(a)(1)(ii).
146. Id. § 2(a)(2).
147. Id. § 3(a)(3).
148. Id. § 14(a).
149. ld. § 8.
however, the principle will not be applied when there is a risk of harm
to the child. 5 '
VI. Conclusion
Few effective remedies exist for the child who is forcibly abduct-
ed by his parent. This parental act, nevertheless, constitutes kidnap-
ping. There is a direct interference with the child's liberty, an
interference with the custodial rights of the other parent, and often a
defiance of a court-issued custody decree. Yet, parents are exempt
from state kidnapping statutes and the Federal Kidnapping Act.'
State courts have exempted parents by relying on concepts of parental
instincts and a rights-duties analysis of parenthood. This leniency
has been extended to agents of the abducting parent, although with-
out logical foundation for the extension.
Civil remedies are available to the child, but are an inadequate
deterrent to parental kidnapping. In a majority of states parental
immunity persists. Even when immunity is abrogated, civil liability
remains an unlikely remedy. If a child does bring suit, traditional
parental defenses of good faith and concern for child welfare proba-
bly will bar recovery. Although a parent who willfully defies a
custody decree is subject to civil contempt charges, this deterrent is
similarly ineffective. Courts cannot enforce civil contempt citations
beyond the limits of the state, the typical refuge of abducting parents.
For a number of reasons noncustodial parents will risk civil and
criminal liability by abducting their children and transporting them
across state lines. First, there is the general ineffectiveness of the
remedies available. Second, the parent who removes his child to
another state usually is rewarded with a favorable custody determina-
tion. Many states will grant a custody hearing on the mere physical
presence of the child within its borders. A hearing often is granted
despite the parent's defiance of another state's decree or a child
custody agreement. Third, the local petitioner commonly is favored
regardless of his lack of clean hands. Fourth, forum shopping has
been encouraged by the failure of the United States Supreme Court to
apply the full faith and credit clause to custody determinations. Last,
although some relief is promised by the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, to date it has been adopted by only six states.
Thus, a clear need has been demonstrated for effective sanctions
against forcible abduction of children by their parents. These sanc-
tions can be criminal or civil. Since most children are abducted in
150. Id. § 8(b).




search of a favorable custody decree, the problem also can be reme-
died by uniform standards of custody jurisdiction. These standards
should be established by strict application of the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution or by adoption of uniform legislation.
JANE A. LEWIS
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